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 1 Introduction
According to standard analysis, investment neutrality requires full deduction
of both investment costs and interest expenses.1 However, the available evi-
dence (e.g. Devereux et al. (2002)) shows that, in most countries, the present
value of depreciation allowances is usually less than 100% of the investment
cost. This widespread phenomenon, illustrated in Figure 1, may then lead
to the conclusion that current tax systems discourage investment.
A recent stream of literature has tried to explain this policy by means
of optimal tax theory. In particular, Hau￿ er and Schjelderup (2000) have
shown that when foreign direct investments are allowed and ￿rms can shift
pro￿ts, it is optimal for the governments to allow the partial deductibility
of investment costs. Becker and Fuest (2005) have found a similar result if
mobile ￿rms are more pro￿table than immobile ￿rms.
It is worth noting that the above literature disregards the fact that ￿rms￿
capital structure can be the optimal solution for a trade-o⁄between costs and
bene￿ts of debt ￿nancing.2 In this article we provide a simple explanation for
the apparently unfavorable tax treatment of investment costs by accounting
for the fact that a signi￿cant portion of investment is usually debt ￿nanced.
In particular, we apply a real-option model where the ￿rm can decide not
only whether but also when to invest. We will then show that, coeteris
paribus, debt ￿nancing induces the ￿rm to invest earlier in order to bene￿t
from interest deductibility. As long as full deduction of interest expenses
is allowed and ￿rms can optimally choose their capital structure, therefore,
less favorable depreciation allowances are o⁄set by tax bene￿ts arising from
optimal leverage. This leads to the conclusion that partial deduction of
capital cost is a necessary condition for investment neutrality to hold.
The structure of article is as follows. In section 2 we develop the model.
In section 3 we analyze ￿rms￿decisions on the optimal capital structure and
investment timing. Neutrality properties are ￿nally discussed in section 4.
1For instance Brown (1948, p. 537) argues that distortions "can be substantially elim-
inated by a system which permits the ￿rm to deduct either (1) current outlays (or an
average of outlays for a short period) on depreciable assets or (2) normal depreciation on
total assets" (p.537). For further details on this literature see Stiglitz (1973) and Sinn
(1987).
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Figure 1: Present discounted value of depreciation allowances in industrial-
ized countries (2005). Source: Klemm (2005) at http://www.ifs.org.uk/
2 The model
In this section we introduce a model describing the ￿nancial and invest-
ment strategies of a representative ￿rm. We assume that the ￿rm starts to
earn a payo⁄ ￿t once an investment cost, denoted as I, has been paid. As
time passes, depreciation entails that investment￿ s productivity decreases or,
equivalently, maintenance costs raise.
The ￿rm￿ s payo⁄ evolves according to the following geometric Brownian
motion
d￿t = ￿￿tdt + ￿￿tdzt; with ￿0 > 0, (1)
where ￿ ￿ ￿
0￿￿ is the expected rate of growth, that is given by the di⁄erence
between the gross-of-depreciation growth rate ￿
0 less the depreciation rate
￿; which entails a gradual decrease in the project￿ s pro￿tability. Moreover,
￿ and dzt are the instantaneous standard deviation and the increment of a
standard Wiener process, respectively.
We assume that risk is fully diversi￿able, credit markets are perfectly
competitive, and information is symmetric. Moreover we assume that:
3Assumption 1 when the ￿rm invests it can borrow some resources and pay
a constant coupon C ￿ ￿0, that cannot be renegotiated;
Assumption 2 default takes place when ￿t drops to C;
Assumption 3 the cost of default is proportional to the coupon received,
namely default cost ￿C with ￿ > 0.
In line with Leland (1994), assumption 1 entails that the ￿rm sets a
coupon and then computes the market value of debt. In the absence of
arbitrage, this is equivalent to ￿rst set the value of debt and, then, compute
the e⁄ective interest rate under the non-arbitrage condition. For simplicity,
we also assume that debt cannot be renegotiated.3
Assumptions 2 and 3 describe default. According to assumption 2 default
occurs when the ￿rm does not meet its debt obligation: in particular, default
is triggered when the ￿rm￿ s payo⁄￿ falls to the exogenously given threshold
point C. This means that debt is protected, since condition ￿ = C is a
collateral constraint.4 In the event of default, the ￿rm is expropriated by the
lender. According to assumption 3, expropriation causes the lender to face a
sunk default cost, ￿C; that is proportional to the coupon paid.5
Let us next introduce taxation. With no loss of generality we assume that
when the ￿rm invests it immediately receives a tax rebate equal to ￿￿I, where
￿ is the relevant tax rate and ￿ is the present value of depreciation.6 Moreover
we assume that, in line with most existing systems, interest payments are
fully deductible, so that the ￿rm￿ s tax base is (￿t ￿ C): Finally we assume
3For an analysis of debt renegotiation see e.g. Goldstein et al. (2001).
4As pointed out by Leland (1994), minimum net-worth requirements, implied by pro-
tected debt, are common in short-term debt ￿nancing. It is worth noting that the quality
of results would not change if we assumed that debt is unprotected. This kind of debt
is more common in long-term debt ￿nancing and entails that default timing is optimally
chosen by shareholders. For further details on default conditions see Smith and Warner
(1977). For a study of corporate taxation under default risk see also Panteghini (2006).
5The quality of results does not change if we assume that the cost of default is propor-
tional to the ￿rm value, rather than to the debt value. For a detailed analysis of default
costs see e.g. Branch (2002).
6Notice that the quality of results would not change if we assumed that ￿scal depreci-
ation allowances were deducted year by year. In this case, however, computations would
be messy.
4that, before default, the lender is tax exempt.7 After default, however, she
becomes shareholder and is thus subject to corporate taxation.
3 The ￿rms￿decisions
The ￿rm￿ s problem is thus one of choosing both the investment timing (T ￿ t)










[(1 ￿ ￿)(￿s ￿ C)]e




where Et f:g is the expectation operator and r is the exogenously given risk-
free interest rate.
It is worth noting that the optimal investment time T corresponds to a
trigger point ￿ ￿. This means that whenever the current payo⁄reaches ￿ ￿, the
￿rm invests. Omitting for simplicity the time variable, and de￿ning ￿ as the
current payo⁄ we can thus rewrite (2) as follows (see Appendix A):
max
￿ ￿>0;C>0





















where ￿ ￿ r ￿￿.9 Solving (3) (see Appendix B) we obtain the optimal ratio






















7Given that e⁄ective tax rates on capital income are fairly low, this simplifying as-
sumption does not look unrealistic.
8The existence of a trade-o⁄ between default costs and tax bene￿ts of debt ￿nancing
induces the ￿rm to choose the optimal value of C.
9The term ￿ is the so-called convenience (or dividend) yield, which must be positive in
order for a solution to be obtained (see Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).












￿2 > 0; ￿1 > 1, and ￿2 < 0:





is positively related to ￿ and
negatively related to the default cost parameter ￿:10
Eq. (5) shows that the ￿rm￿ s investment timing depends on ￿nancial
strategies. In particular the term 1
1+m(￿) measures the leverage e⁄ect of debt
￿nancing on the ￿rm￿ s trigger point. Given 1
1+m(￿) < 1, we can indeed state
that debt ￿nancing induces the ￿rm to invest earlier. The intuition behind
this result is straightforward: if a ￿rm can borrow, it will be stimulated to
invest earlier in order to bene￿t from interest deductibility. We can thus say
that full deductibility of interest expenses is equivalent ￿overinvestment￿in
a static framework. While the standard notion of ￿overinvestment￿typically
refers to the amount spent by the ￿rm, in this context we can use the term
overinvestment to de￿ne the situation where the expected value of investment
at any given time is greater than the laissez-faire one. This result will then
be used to address our policy implications in terms of neutrality.
4 Investment neutrality
Let us next explore under what conditions the corporation tax is neutral in







It is worth noting that setting ￿ = 0 entails that the tax bene￿t of debt is
null. In the absence of taxation, therefore, the optimal ￿nancial strategy is
to use only equity ￿nance.11
Given (6) we can say that investment timing is una⁄ected by taxation if
the equality
￿ ￿ = ￿
￿ (7)
10This results are in line with the empirical evidence provided by Fan et al. (2003). For
a detailed discussion on tax-induced debt ￿nancing see also Graham (2003).
11Notice that the quality of results would not change if we introduced non-tax bene￿ts
of debt ￿nancing (e.g. related to agency costs). In this case laissez-faire investment would
be partially debt ￿nanced.
6holds.12 If this is true taxation does not distort the investment decision.
Substituting (5) and (6) into (7) we obtain
1 ￿ ￿￿
1 ￿ ￿
= 1 + m(￿) (8)
where ￿ is the value of ￿ that ensures neutrality in terms of investment
timing. Using (8) we know that 1￿￿￿
1￿￿ > 1: It is thus straightforward to show
that investment timing is una⁄ected by taxation if the present value of ￿scal
depreciation allowances is
￿ = ￿ < 1:
This result provides a simple explanation for the apparently unfavorable tax
treatment of investment. It is indeed shown that less favorable depreciation
allowances compensate for tax bene￿ts (and thus leverage e⁄ects) arising
from debt. As long as full deduction of interest expenses is allowed and ￿rms
can optimally choose their capital structure, therefore, the present value
of depreciation allowances must be less than 100% in order for investment
timing not to be distorted.
12In line with Johansson (1969), we can say that condition (7) ensures an identical
ranking in a pre-tax and in a post-tax pro￿tability analysis. For further details on tax
neutrality in a real-option setting see Niemann (1999), and Panteghini (2001).
7A The computation of (3)
To obtain (3) we must compute both the value of equity and the value of
debt. Let us then de￿ne E (￿;C) as the market value of the equity. Following
Leland (1994), we derive its contingent claim value as the solution of the
following non-arbitrage condition13






















where ￿ ￿ r￿￿: Terms ￿1 > 1 and ￿2 < 0 are the roots of the characteristic
equation ￿(￿) = 1
2￿2￿(￿ ￿ 1) + (r ￿ ￿)￿ ￿ r = 0:14 Let us next compute
the constants A1 and A2: In the absence of any ￿nancial bubbles, A1 is nil.
To compute A2, notice that default occurs when ￿ drops to C; namely the





















The value of debt, de￿ned as D(￿;C); must satisfy the following non-
arbitrage condition





13For further details on mathematical steps see Panteghini (2006).
















￿2 < 0, respectively.
15Remember that we assumed that debt is protected. For a comparison with default
under unprotected debt ￿nancing see Panteghini (2006).
8where G = (1 ￿ ￿)￿;C: The closed-form solution of (12) is:
D(￿;C) =
8
> > > > <












To compute B2 we use the boundary condition D(0;C) = 0; which means
that when ￿ falls to zero the lender￿ s post-default claim is nil. Thus we
have B2 = 0. In the absence of any ￿nancial bubble, moreover, we have
B1 = D1 = 0: Finally, to compute D2 we let the pre-default branch of (13)









Solving (14) for D2 and substituting into (13) thus yields
D(￿;C) =
( (1￿￿)￿














Let us next compute the value function. Using (11) and (15) we then
obtain the ￿rm￿ s net present value












￿ (1 ￿ ￿￿)I:
(16)
Given (16) we can rewrite (2) as




￿ W(￿ ￿;C): (17)








Using (17) we thus obtain (3).
B First order conditions
The ￿rst order conditions of (3) are






































Rearranging (18) one easily obtains (4). Substituting (4) into (19) and rear-
ranging thus yields (5).
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